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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

of decisions is to hold picketing, in the absence of an employeremployee dispute, a valid assertion of the constitutional right. 2 4 The
principal case, therefore, while doing an about-face from the previous
Florida position, 25 represents the current tendency of state decisions. 2 6
Whether the Florida Supreme Court is taking the view that picketing
amounts to something more than freedom of speech is not clear. Too
wide a construction would lead only to more confusion. The doctrine,
understood and applied in its qualified and not its absolute sense, is
a major step forward in the direction of stabilization of the law in the
field of labor relations; whatever one may think of picketing as an
economic weapon, certainty in the law is at least preferable to the chaos
of no settled doctrine at all.
Roy T. RHODES

QUIET TITLE:

WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL BY DEFENDANT
IN POSSESSION

Palmer v. Greene, 31 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1947)
Plaintiff filed a bill to quiet title against defendants in possession.
Defendants filed cross-bill to quiet title in themselves. On the first hearing
decree for plaintiff was reversed, with directions to transfer the cause to
law. Plaintiff was granted a rehearing.' HFLD, for plaintiff, in equity,
on ground defendant had not established adverse possession. Decree
affirmed, Chief Justice Thomas, Justice Chapman, and Associate Justice
Smith adhering to the former unanimous view that the cause should be
transferred to law.
2

'Bakery

Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.

S.

769 (1942); American Fed. Labor v.

Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941) ; Dinoffria v. International

Brotherhood, 331 Ill. App.

129, 72 N. E.2d 635 (1947); Johnson v. Clements, 38 Misc. 204, 77 N. Y. S.2d 219

(1947); Jones, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 75 N. E.2d 446 (Com. Pl.
Ohio 1947); Lubbers v. Hurst, 78 N. E.2d 580 (Com. P1. Ohio 1946).
"'Retail Clerks' Union v. Lerner Shops Inc., 140 Fla. 865, 193 So. 529 (1939).
2
"Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood, 311 I1. App. 129, 72 N. E.2d 635 (1947);
Glover v. Minneapolis Buildings Trade Council, 215 Minn. 533, 10 N. W.2d 481
(1943) ; Johnson v. Clements, 38 Misc. 204, 77 N. Y. S.2d 219 (1947) ; Jones, Inc.,
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 75 N.E.2d 446 (Com. P1. Ohio 1947).
'31 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1947). Commented on as to adverse possession, 1 U. or FLA.
L. Rzv. 291 (1948).
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CASE COMMENTS
A non-statutory bill to quiet title cannot be brought against a defendant in possession, since the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law in ejectment and the defendant has a right to trial by jury.2 A
large majority of the states have broadened the equitable remedy by
statute; 3 however, a defendant in possession cannot be deprived of
his right to a jury trial under such statutes."
The first Florida quiet-tifle statute was held unconstitutional in so
far as it would deprive defendant of his right to trial by jury.5 A
later case stated that a subsequent statute could not be so construed
as to impair the constitutional right.& Accordingly, the 1925 law
authorized demand for trial by jury whenever any defendant is in possession. 7 In the final disposition of the present case no statute was
mentioned, but the decision necessarily implies that the action was brought
under this provision, and that the defendant had forfeited any right to

a jury trial.
Trial by jury in fact, as distinct from the right to a jury, must be
requested in any civil case.8 A provision for demand is sufficient to
preserve the right of trial by jury.9 The demand must be timely; generally
speaking, this means that it must be made before trial.1o The right
may be lost in civil cases by waiver implied from any conduct incon-

nWhitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 (1891); 1 Ponmoy, EQuTrYr §177 (5th
ed. 1941).
8
E.g., CAL. CODE §738 (1937); NED. STAT. §76-401 (1929); Ely v. New Mexico
& A. Ry.,-129 U. S. 291 (1889); 4 Poxmtoy, EQuITY §1396 (5th ed. 1941).
'5 Pommoy, EQuITY §2158 (4th ed. 1919) ; WAlsH, EQuITY 553 (1930).
'Fr.5A STAir. §66.10 (1941), Trustees v. Gleason, 39 Fla. 771, 23 So. 539 (1897);
Hughes v. Hannah, 39 Fla. 365, 22 So. 613 (1897); see FLA. CONST., Deci. of Rights

§3.
'F-A. STAT. §66.11 (1941); see Briles v. Bradford, 54 Fla. 501, 508, 44 So. 937,
939 (1907).
T
FLA. STAT. §66.16 (1941), ...
provided, however, that if the defendant or

any of them in such case is in the actual possession of any part of the land involved in such suit, a trial by jury may be demanded by either party, whereupon
the court shall order said cause to be docketed on the law side of said court..."
'E.g., Gilman v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 91 U. S. 603, 614 (1875) (garnishment) ; Griffen v. Bolen, 149 Fla. 377, 5 So.2d 690 (1942)
v. Oranie, 104 Fla. 225, 139 So. 593 (1932) (attachment).

(quiet title); Carroll

Perego v. Dodge, 163 U. S. 160 (1896); Hawkins v. Rellim Invest. Co., 92 Fla.
784, 110 So. 350 (1926).

"0Pearce v. Union Nat. Bank, 33 F.2d 997 (N. D. Ohio 1929); Rosenthal v.

Largo Land Co., 146 Fla. 81, 200 S. 233 (1941).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss1/19

2

Pyle: Quiet Title: Waiver of Jury Trial by Defendant in Possession
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

sistent with an intention to assert it,11 such as consent to reference to a
master,' 2 or acquiesence in trial by the court.' 3 If the defendant files
a counterclaim asking that title be quieted in him, such participation constitutes a waiver.'' This is the situation presented in the principal case.
The following procedure has been stated as proper under the Florida
statute:' 5 On a claim of possesion by defendant, the court must first
make a finding on that question. If the court determines that any of
the property is in the possession of any defendant, any party may demand a jury trial; thereupon the court must transfer the cause to law.
If no demand is made, the right to a jury trial is deemed waived.
The constitutional right to jury trial should not be frittered away by
permitting suits in equity in lieu of actions that should be brought at
law.' ( The Florida Court has held it proper to order the dismissal of a
bill for want of equity. even though the jurisdictional issue has not been
raised.' 7 A jury trial in fact, as distinct from the right to a jury, is
not compulsory, however;' 8 accordingly the court has no duty to see
that parties avail themselves of the privilege. Statutes providing for
trial by jury on demand are permissive rather than mandatory; they
grant the right to jury trial but do not require it.'0
The effect of the present case is that in Florida the statutory action
may be used instead of ejectment to settle both title and possession,
despite possession by the defendant, unless one of the parties asserts
his right to a trial by jury. This result is not in conflict with statutory
"American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 250 U. S. 360, 366 (1922);
In re Shambow's Estate, 153 Fla. 762, 15 So.2d 837 (1943).
"In re Baker, 13 F.2d 119 (C. C. A. 9th 1926); Rosenthal v. Largo Land Co.,
146 Fla. 81, 200 So. 233 (1941).
"Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (C. C. A. 7th), cert. denied,
283 U. S. 843 (1930); Revell v. State ex rel. Howard, 130 Fla. 242, 177 So. 623
(1937).
"4N. M. STAT. §25-1301 (1941), see Quintana v. Vigil, 46 N. M. 200, 125 P.2d
711, 713-715 (1942). But cf. Pankey v. Ortiz, 26 N. M. 575, 195 Pac. 906 (1921).
FLA. STAT. §66.16 (1941), Albury v. Drummond, 95 Fla. 265, 116 So. 236 (1928);
cf. Day v. Benesh, 104 Fla. 58, 139 So. 448 (1932).
"Jansik v. Studstill & Hollenbeck, 153 Fla. 870, 16 So.2d 165 (1944).
"Trustees v. Gleason, 39 Fla. 771, 23 So. 539 (1897); ci. Sammis v. L'Engle, 19
Fla. 800, 810 (1883).
"Prince Line Ltd. v. American Paper Exports, Inc., 55 F.2d 1053 (C. C. A. 2nd
1932).
"9 Kass v. Baskin, 164 F.2d 513 (App. D. C. 1947); cf. Tilton v. Horton, 103
Fla. 497, 137 So. 801 (1931).
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